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U.S. Sends Troops To Honduras, Justified By Nicaraguan
"invasion": Summary Of Events &amp; Statements, March
19-21
by Deborah Tyroler
Category/Department: General
Published: Wednesday, March 23, 1988
March 18: Honduran President Jose Azcona, insisting that up to 2,000 Sandinista Army troops still
occupied 36 square miles of Honduran territory, threatened to launch new air strikes and commit
ground troops to the region if the Sandinistas failed to withdraw within 24 hours. "We cannot allow
the violation of Honduran territory. For that we have the armed forces. We don't have the proof
that the troops in Honduras have been withdrawn," Azcona said. A diplomat in Tegucigalpa told
the Washington Post that he did not think the Hondurans would commit ground troops to the
Bocay region. If the Sandinistas refuse to pull out, more air strikes could be expected, the diplomat
said, adding he did not know what the Honduran response would be if the Sandinistas refused
to withdraw after additional Honduran air strikes. The Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry dispatched
a formal protest note to the US State Department pointing out that the air raid on Sandinista
Army positions in Jinotega department jeopardized the lives of civilians, including US journalists.
According to Radio Nicaragua, at least eight violations of Nicaraguan airspace in the northern
region occurred on several planes violated Nicaraguan airspace on Friday. Included was a flight
over Corinto, Nicaragua's largest port. Sandinista soldiers reportedly responded to the overflights
with anti-aircraft fire, and the planes retreated to Honduran territory. US and Honduran intelligence
reports reportedly indicated that the fighting between Sandinista troops and contras in the Bocay
region, about 150 miles east of Tegucigalpa, had diminished by Friday morning. Sandinista soldiers
allegedly fired white phosphorous artillery shells at contra positions inside Honduras. At the United
Nations, the Security Council approved a decision by Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar to
send a team of UN military observers to Nicaragua to determine the facts of the border fighting.
Nicaragua had requested a joint team of observers from the United Nations and Organization
of American States to tour both sides of the border in the Bocay region. Honduras rejected that
request. Nicaragua charged President Reagan with launching a "prefabricated crisis" designed
to abort the Central American peace process, sabotage talks between the government and rebel
forces, win congressional support for US military aid to the contras and lay the groundwork "for
possible direct military intervention against our country." Nicaragua's UN Ambassador, Rita Delia
Casco, did not deny that Nicaraguan troops had entered Honduras. She suggested they were in hot
pursuit of contra forces amid combat that began three miles inside Nicaragua. Delia Casco defended
Sandinista military actions as self defense against "mercenary" troops based in Honduras. The US
ambassador to the United Nations, Herbert Okun, replied that "this invasion was no accident. It was
not hot pursuit. It was and is a planned offensive, one of the largest military operations mounted by
the Sandinistas since they took power in 1979." The US deployment of troops in Honduras, Okun
said, was a "measured" response to show support for the Hondurans and "does not constitute either
a threat or the use of force against Nicaragua." Contra supporters in the Senate proposed a new
$48 million aid package that would permit up to $2.5 million worth of previously authorized arms
and ammunition to go into the pipeline for the contras. According to a report by the Washington
Post (03/18/88), administration sources said the decision to double US troop numbers in Honduras
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was taken at an 11 a.m. meeting on March 16 at the Oval Office, about 11 hours before the action
was formally announced. The version supplied by the sources, who spoke on the condition they
not be identified, differed from the official one presented late Wednesday night by White House
spokesperson Marlin Fitzwater and other officials. The spokesperson said Reagan received a
letter from Honduran President Jose Azcona Hoyo at 7 p.m. Wednesday, and made the decision
an hour later after a briefing by national security adviser Colin Powell and White House chief of
staff Howard Baker. A senior official said that Reagan reached what amounted to "a decision in
principle" to commit troops in discussions with advisers on Wednesday morning. The condition
was that troops would be sent only if requested by Azcona, but it was widely believed among highranking officials that this action was merely a formality. Military officials said that units of the 82nd
Airborne Division were put on alert at 12:55 p.m. Wednesday, eight hours before a letter from
Azcona arrived. At that time, the 82nd Airborne units and two two battalions of the 7th Infantry
Division (Light) at Fort Ord, Calif., were being readied for deployment. [The Azcona letter did not
make a specific request for the sending of US troops. It denounced the "unjustifiable aggression"
of the Sandinista forces and asked Reagan for "effective and immediate assistance to maintain the
sovereign and territorial integrity of my country."] The option of sending US troops was one of three
proposals discussed with the president at the 11 a.m. Wednesday meeting. Other options included
augmenting the US helicopter fleet at Palmerola Air Base near the Honduran capital of Tegucigalpa
and expanding the US fixed-wing force at the same base. According to a statement by the Peruvian
Foreign Ministry, the unwarranted buildup of US troops in Honduras poses a threat to the security
of all Central American nations, and provokes a deterioration of the political climate needed for
fulfillment of the regional peace treaty. The statement, published in Peruvian newspapers on Friday,
indicated that President Alan Garcia's government has publicly expressed profound concern over
the Reagan administration's decision to increase US troop strength in Honduras. The Foreign
Ministry demanded the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Central America, as required by the
regional peace accord. The Uruguayan and Ecuadoran foreign ministries instructed their respective
ambassadors to the United Nations to endorse an eventual statement by Contadora and Support
Group nations condemning any form of intervention. March 19: Honduran jets bombed Nicaraguan
forces along the Coco River border with Honduras. It was unclear whether the air strikes occurred
on the Honduran or Nicaraguan side of the river. Information on casualties was not available. A
national Honduran radio broadcast reported that the bombings were of Nicaraguan positions in
southern Honduras. The radio said they were ordered after US and Honduran intelligence found
Nicaraguans laying mines in 50 square miles of Honduran territory as they withdrew. In Managua,
the Nicaraguan Defense Ministry reported that Honduran fighter jets dropped four bombs on
Nicaraguan military sites six miles within Nicaragua, at San Andres de Bocay, and continued
three more miles inside Nicaragua before returning to Honduras. A Nicaraguan Defense Ministry
spokesman denied that troops were sowing mines in Honduras: "The Honduran threat to attack
our forces is an empty one because all Sandinista troops are inside Nicaraguan territory. They
can look for us (in Honduras) but they won't find anything." US troops from the 82nd Airborne
Division prepared to position themselves for exercises with Honduran troops at a small air strip
less than 20 miles from the Nicaraguan border. [According to the Post, the move of the US troops
to the small dirt air strip at Jamastran in El Pariaso department, 19 miles from the Nicaraguan
border, appeared to presage US helicoptering of Honduran troops toward the border, as was done
twice in 1986 after other alleged Sandinista incursions. In both the previous cases, the main staging
point was the strip at Jamastran which was expanded by US Army engineers on maneuvers a year
ago.] Pentagon officials have said that the US troops airlifted to Honduras on March 17 would be
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conducting exercises with Honduran troops for the next 10 days but had no plans to move any closer
than 20 miles from the Nicaraguan border. US officials said that although Jamastran was closer
to the Nicaraguan border, it was still some 70 miles west of the isolated spot where the fighting
between Nicaraguan troops and contras was taking place. In Washington, State Department officials
said their latest intelligence indicated that Nicaraguan forces did appear to be withdrawing. They
said some had crossed back over the border but added that they did not have a reliable estimate of
the numbers. At the height of the offensive, the officials said, the Sandinista forces had penetrated
to within two miles of a contra supply base, but had failed to achieve their apparent objectives of
capturing it or key contra leaders. Contra spokesman Bosco Matamoros said in Miami that the
contras were facing serious transportation problems and had no means of moving their men or
materiel. In Moscow, the official Tass news agency accused the United States of using military
threats to impose its will on Nicaragua and to spoil those peace efforts. "Washington is actually
doing its utmost for preventing a just peaceful settlement in Central America, for procrastinating
and aggravating the conflict despite its eloquent statements in favor of the termination of regional
conflicts," Tass said. In his weekly radio address, Reagan blamed the Sandinista incursion into
Honduras on Congress' decision to cut off aid to the contras, saying the "aid cutoff is giving the
communist dictators" a chance to "smash their opponents." House Majority Leader Thomas S. Foley
(D-Wash.) commented that Reagan was "carefully forgetting his facts...The last aid proposal that
came to the House was supported by the Democratic leadership and most Democrats. But it was
supported by only five Republicans. The bill was opposed and defeated by Republicans. That defeat
was applauded by the president." According to Reagan, "The freedom fighters are in desperate
need of support...If they are to remain a viable and effective force, they must have assistance now."
Foley said, "I think the administration and many Republicans in the House now regret opposing the
humanitarian aid package. As well they should. There is no evidence that the Sandinista invasion
has crippled the contra movement, though that may well have been its intention. The sending of
forces to Honduras was not required by any military emergency." Foley said that it is clear the
Sandinistas had been preparing for their invasion for several weeks. "If it indeed occurred the week
following the cutoff vote of March 3, it was the administration and the Republicans in the House
who cause the defeat of that vote. So one has to wonder whether it is not intentionally confusing
for the president to suggest that the cutoff of aid emboldened the Sandinistas when he and 97%
of the members of his party were responsible for that failure." US officials reiterated Fitzwater's
Wednesday night statement that the new US troops are not being sent to Honduras for combat. A
Honduran Foreign Ministry statement said that on Tuesday "several hundred" Nicaraguan troops,
supported by artillery, aircraft and helicopter bombings, entered Honduran territory. Azcona at
that time reportedly contacted Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, "demanding that he order
his troops to refrain from violating Honduran national territory," the statement said. It added that
he also contacted Presidents Jose Napoleon Duarte of El Salvador, Vinicio Cerezo of Guatemala
and Oscar Arias Sanchez of Costa Rica asking them to back up his pleas to Nicaragua. On Tuesday
evening, according to US accounts, US Ambassador Everett Briggs met Azcona to discuss the
situation. The Honduran Foreign Ministry said Azcona, after talking to the other Central American
presidents, "addressed a letter" to Reagan asking him for "his solidarity" in repelling Nicaragua.
[The letter from Azcona to Reagan on which the dispatch of US troops is formally based is dated
March 15, Tuesday, and the Honduran Foreign Ministry statement indicated it was dispatched
Tuesday. Washington officials in several agencies said it was not given to Briggs or transmitted to
Washington until late Wednesday.] By Saturday, according to the Washington Post, contradictory
accounts on Sandinista military actions had yielded a rudimentary picture of the Bocay campaign.
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The Sandinistas' special counterinsurgency and light artillery units began March 6 sweeping
northwest toward the Bocay River. The contras fell back, some into Honduras. The contras fought for
three days to defend one Nicaraguan hill, called La Coneja, but eventually abandoned that vantage
point as well. On March 14, several hundred Sandinista troops crossed the Coco River in rafts and
continued their pursuit as deep as five miles into dense Honduran jungles. But they turned back
Wednesday afternoon before reaching the contras' main base camps. The fighting and sporadic
shelling by both sides along the Coco River had ceased completely by the morning of March 19,
according to Sandinista and contra commanders. Contra commanders said they had lost several
field clinics and some caches, but retained most of their military supplies. Contra deaths said contra
sources, numbered 10, and not 92, as reported by the Nicaraguan government. According to a report
by Nicaraguan Defense Minister Humberto Ortega, the "Dante Operation" beginning on March 1
was successful, resulting in 400 contra casualties, including 100 dead. March 18-19: Prensa Latina
reported that several regional organizations and numerous Latin American governments, trade
unions and political parties have condemned the doubling of US troop presence in Honduras,
and the Honduran Air Force bombing inside Nicaraguan territory. Statements were released by
the Group of 8 (composed of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Panama, Peru, Mexico, Uruguay and
Venezuela); the Latin American Economic System (SELA), headquartered in Caracas, Venezuela; the
Cartagena Group; and the Latin American Parliament, headquartered in Peru. General Secretary of
the Latin American Parliament, Andres Towsend, said that Washington's decision is an obstruction
to the Central American peace process formalized by the Esquipulas II accord. Towsend added
that the Parliament firmly condemns any foreign interference, and demands that the principle of
non-interference in Latin American domestic affairs be respected. March 19-20: Demonstrations
and rallies were organized in several US cities to protest Washington's actions in Central America.
For instance, on March 20, about 5,000 demonstrators at a rally in downtown Boston called for a
permanent end to US support for the contras, and withdrawal of all US troops from Honduras. On
the same day, at Wrightstown, New Jersey, about 100 demonstrators blocked the entrance to the
air base there to protest participation of US military helicopters in actions near the Nicaraguan
border. Four demonstrators were arrested. Large demonstrations and rallies also took place in
Washington, Minneapolis, Chicago, Salt Lake City, Seattle, San Francisco, among other cities. As
of March 20, the total number of individuals arrested in such protests totaled over 350. March 21:
A Honduran government spokesperson said that the last of the Sandinista troops who had crossed
into Honduras last week have returned to Nicaragua. A military spokesperson said Honduran
troops had moved into the area in the vicinity of the Bocay and Coco Rivers and were searching for
anti-personnel mines, which he said the retreating Sandinistas planted. The more than 3,000 US
combat troops that ware sent to Honduras continued joint exercises with Honduran soldiers. In a
parachute exercise involving Hondurans and the 82d Airborne Division, one parachute failed to
open. The exercise was near the Honduran airborne troop headquarters in Tamara, a short distance
northwest of Tegucigalpa. A US military spokesperson said that a US military transport helicopter
crashed during maneuvers, injuring all 10 soldiers on board, and that the cause of the crash was
under investigation. He said the Huey UH-1 crashed at Juticalpa, 90 miles northeast of Tegucigalpa
and that the injured were being taken to the hospital at Palmerola Air Base. (Basic data from various
reports by Washington Post, AP, Reuter, Prensa Latina, Tass, New York Times)
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